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This  article  discusses  the  role  of  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  (MLA)  and  other
established  mechanisms  of  international  cooperation  in  the  fight  against  cyber
crime. The analysis is limited to mechanisms facilitating access to extraterritorially
located  data.  After  a  brief  account on the  legal  prerequisites  of  successful  fight
against cyber crime, the article proceeds to exploring both traditional as well as
alternative cooperation mechanisms for transborder data access. Given the realistic
assessment that the amount of digital evidence to be accessed extraterritorially will
only increase  with time, the  article focuses  on the  difficulties  in accessing data
under the current MLA procedures. The article reiterates that States are in need for
more  time-effective  measures  for  transborder  data  access.  Unless  the  identified
inefficiencies  pertaining  to  MLA  are  addressed,  the  traditional  focus  on
territoriality,  and  assuming  the  other  State  being  the  primary  counterpart  for
carrying out investigative measures requiring transborder access to evidence, will
continue to gradually shift to more operational mechanisms that do not necessarily
require the prior authorisation of the State where the data is located. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cyber  crime  investigations  are  increasingly  faced  with  complex
jurisdictional  puzzles  where  the  victim,  the  perpetrator,  the  Service
Provider (SP) and evidence may easily all reside in different jurisdictions. 1
Law enforcement agencies have long realised that the success of such cross-
border  investigations  relies  to  a  great  degree  on  up  to  date  legal  and
procedural frameworks as well as functional mechanisms for international
cooperation. In particular, and not only for the fight against cyber crime but
increasingly  for  any  crime  with  transnational  character  or  if  involving
evidence  stored  abroad,  there  is  a  need  for  timely  measures  accessing
evidence that is located in foreign jurisdiction. 
This  article  discusses  the role of  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  (MLA) and
other  established  mechanisms  of  international  cooperation  in  the  fight
against  cyber  crime.  The  analysis  is  limited  to  mechanisms  facilitating
access to extraterritorially located data. After a brief  account on the legal
prerequisites of an effective fight against cyber crime, the article proceeds to
exploring both traditional (such as MLA) as well as alternative cooperation
mechanisms for transborder data access. Given the realistic assessment that
the amount of digital  evidence  to be accessed extraterritorially will  only
increase with time, the article focuses on the difficulties in accessing data
under the current MLA procedures. The article reiterates that States are in
need of more time-effective measures for transborder data access.  At the
same time, these measures need to be in accordance with both national and
international legal frameworks. 
2. LEGAL PREREQUISITES FOR FIGHTING CYBER CRIME
An efficient  fight  against  cyber  crime  requires  a  well-working  interplay
between a number of legal aspects. Foremost,  successful investigation and
prosecution rely on harmonised and up to date substantial and procedural
criminal  law.  To  that  end,  international  attempts  to  harmonise  different
national criminal laws continue to be important in order to avoid situations
where behaviour rendered legal in one jurisdiction is illegal in another, and
1 According  to  United  Nations  Office  on  Drugs  and  Crime,  Comprehensive  Study  on
Cybercrime,  February  2013,  http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-
crime/UNODC_CCPCJ_EG.4_2013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf.,  “between 50  and 100
per cent of cybercrime acts encountered by the police involve a transnational element.” xxv,
117–118. 
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thus  may  hinder  prosecuting  the  case.2 Equally,  national  law  needs  to
empower law enforcement with necessary tools for  carrying out modern
investigations. In the case of more intrusive measures such as surveillance,3
conditions  for  further  authorisation  of  a  competent  authority  must  be
regulated in a clear and transparent manner and undertaken in accordance
with law in order to be admissible in court. 
The  investigative  measures  relevant  for  the  purposes  of  this  article
pertain  to  obtaining  extraterritorially  located  evidence.  Channels  for
obtaining data located extraterritorially may be built on formal or informal
relationships but must at all counts be in line with international law as well
as  supported  by  domestic  legislation  and  accepted  procedures.  Among
other restrictions, these measures need to take into account the boundaries
set by jurisdiction that reflect the extent of a State’s right to regulate the
conduct or the consequences of events.4 In the context of cyber crime, the
interpretation and implementation of jurisdictional principles play a role in
establishing  jurisdiction  for  both  prosecuting  the  offence  (prescriptive
jurisdiction,  adjudicative  jurisdiction)  as  well  as  for  specific  cross-border
investigatory  measures  (jurisdiction  to  enforce).  Although  jurisdiction  is
primarily  territorial,  there  may  be  grounds  for  its  extraterritorial
application.
While over the years a lot of research has been undertaken regarding the
limits  of  prescriptive  jurisdiction,  the  territorial  scope  of  jurisdiction  to
enforce  has  received  undeservedly  little  attention.  In  fact,  it  is  the
interpretation of the latter that is especially relevant for outlining the rules
for accessing and obtaining data in foreign jurisdictions.  This is  because,
according to international law, the exercise of jurisdiction to enforce on the
territory of another State is permitted only if the latter provides consent to
such behaviour (such as a based on a bi- or multilateral agreement) or such
a right would be deriving from international customary law.5 States failing
to acquire consent for any  'exercising [of] power' on the foreign territory
2 Marco  Gercke,  Understanding  Cybercrime:  Phenomena,  Challenge  and  Legal  Response
(International  Telecommunication  Union,  2012),  82–83,  https://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/Cybercrime%20legislation%20EV6.pdf.
3 E.g. Estonia, Code of Criminal Procedure, Chapter 3 - Surveillance Activities, RT I, 29.06.2012,
2, entry into force 01.01.2013. 
4 L. Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed (London ; New York: Longman, 1996), 
456.
5 The Case of the S.S. Lotus, Fr. v. Turk, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4 (Decision No. 9), 45
(Permanent Court of International Justice 1927).
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would possibly be acting contrary to the principle of non-intervention6 and
may violate the sovereignty of the States concerned.7 A common way to
avoid  the  possible  breach  of  another  State’s  sovereignty,  if  in  need  of
evidence located extraterritorially or other support in transnational criminal
matters, is basing the cooperation on MLA treaties and another cooperation
mechanisms — and thus requiring the consent (usually of the other State)
before exercising jurisdiction in another State’s territory. 
3. MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TREATIES FOR 
ACCESSING STORED DATA
International  cooperation  in  criminal  matters  that,  in  addition  to  MLA,
consist  of  a  number  of other  cooperative  measures  has  been developing
significantly over last decades. Drivers for these developments have mainly
been  international  communities  or  groups  of  likeminded  States.  For
example, due to transnational organised crime, notably drug trafficking, the
demands for international law enforcement were rapidly increasing during
the 1970s and resulted in the initiation of supplementing the then common
process of rogatory letters8 with more flexible MLA treaties.9
In conjunction with relevant national legislation, requests for accessing
extraterritorially stored data are mostly based on: bi-lateral agreements on
MLA;  or  multilateral  agreements  such  as  the  Council  of  Europe  (CoE)
Convention  on  Cybercrime,  European  Convention  on  Mutual  Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters and other Council of Europe treaties, United
Nations and other international treaties; or reciprocity.10 Depending on the
6 United Nations, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and  Co-Operation  among  States  in  Accordance  with  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations,
A/RES/25/2625, 1970.
7 Pierre Trudel, Jurisdiction over the Internet: A Canadian Perspective, in Int’l L., vol. 32, 1998,
1047.
8 As noted by one author, using letters of rogatory for acquiring evidence from abroad slowed
down the process considerably. He stated that the criminal act and the investigative process
were running at totally different speeds, “instantaneous versus the forever!” Read more: David
J. Davis, “Criminal Law and the Internet:The Investigator’s Perspective,” in Crime, Criminal
Justice and the Internet, ed. Clive Walker and Andrew Ashworth (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1998), 51–52. 
9 Ethan Avram Nadelmann, Cops  Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal
Law Enforcement (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), chap. 6.
10 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance
Provisions  of  the  Budapest  Convention  on  Cybercrime,  December  3,  2014,  31,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/Cybercrime/TCY/2014/T-
CY(2013)17_Assess_report_v50adopted.pdf.
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framework to be used and the countries being requested, the exact content
and conditions for submitting as well as responding to the request differ.11
For example, MLA requests may have to be sent to a central authorising
authority such as the Ministry of Justice, they may be forwarded directly to
the relevant national authorities, or other channels such as INTERPOL may
be used.12 Also, the national bodies authorising, in response to a received
MLA requests, domestic access to stored computer data may vary according
to the type of data to be accessed (e.g. subscriber data, traffic data or content
data).13 Some countries also provide for more expedited procedures such as
“in  cases  of  urgency,  a  request  for  assistance  submitted  through  the
International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) or a notice in the
Schengen Information System may be complied with before the request for
assistance  is  received  by the  Ministry  of  Justice  with  the  consent  of  the
Office of the Prosecutor General.”14
Two  examples  of  international  organisations  that  have  attempted  to
provide  for  more  uniform  approaches  for  MLA  regarding  accessing
extraterritorially  stored  computer  data  are  the  European  Union  and  the
Council of Europe.
3.1 EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union is far from enforcing a pan-European code of criminal
procedure but is increasingly covering different aspects of pre- and post-
trial measures that result in a certain harmonisation of criminal procedure
across Member States.15 The EU’s criminal assistance has been largely built
upon  the  framework  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Mutual
Assistance in  Criminal  Matters16,  parts of the Schengen Convention17,  the
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 38. 
13 Ibid., 31–33.
14 Ibid.,  38;  Estonia,  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  para.  462,  ”Processing  of  requests  for
assistance received from foreign states”.
15 Samuli Miettinen, Criminal Law and Policy in the European Union, Routledge Research in
European Union Law 3 (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge, 2013), 176. 
16 Council of Europe, European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 1959,
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/030.htm.
17 The Schengen Acquis - Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985
between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic
of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common
Borders, Official Journal L 239, 22.09.2000.
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EU  Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters18,  and  its
Protocol.19
Developing a common approach for  more effective  investigations  has
developed in  stages.  In  2003,  the  EU addressed  the  need for  immediate
mutual  recognition  of  orders  to  prevent  the  destruction,  transformation,
moving,  transfer  or  disposal  of  evidence  and  adopted  a  Framework
Decision outlining the rules under which a Member State recognises and
executes in its  territory a freezing order issued by a judicial  authority of
another  Member  State  in  the  framework  of  criminal  proceedings.20
However, as this instrument is restricted to the freezing phase, a freezing
order is required to be accompanied by a separate request for the transfer of
the  evidence to the State issuing  the order in  accordance with  the  rules
applicable  to mutual assistance  in  criminal  matters;  and such a two-step
procedure has proven to be detrimental to its efficiency and seldom used in
practice by the competent authorities.21
In  2008,  the  Council  Framework Decision  for  the  European Evidence
Warrant was adopted to further improve judicial co-operation by applying
the principle of mutual recognition to a judicial decision for the purpose of
obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal
matters.22 However, the instrument has been criticised as having a limited
scope since it only applies to evidence which already exists and thus is not
being as useful to the investigators.23
In  2009,  the  Stockholm  Programme  proposed  setting  up  a
comprehensive system for obtaining evidence in cases with a transborder
dimension that would be based on the principle of mutual recognition, and
18 Council of the European Union, Council Act of 29 May 2000 Establishing in Accordance with
Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters between the Member States of the European Union, OJ C 197, 12.7.2000.
19 Council of the European Union, Council Act of 16 October 2001 Establishing, in Accordance
with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union, the Protocol to the Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, OJ 326,
21.11.2001.
20 Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the Execution in the European
Union of Orders Freezing Property or Evidence, OJ L 196, 2.8.2003, para. 1.
21 European Union, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of Regarding the
European Investigation Order in Criminal Matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, para. 3.
22 European Union, Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the
European Evidence Warrant for the Purpose of Obtaining Objects, Documents and Data for
Use in Proceedings in Criminal Matters, OJ L 350, 30.12.2008.
23 European Union, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of Regarding the
European Investigation Order in Criminal Matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, para 4.
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would  thereby  tackle  the  EU’s  fragmented  approach  to  evidence
gathering.24 Respectively,  the  EU  adopted  in  2014  a  Directive  on  the
European Investigation Order in criminal matters that outlines a framework
for a judicial authority of one Member State to “have one or several specific
investigative measure(s) carried out in another Member State” in order to
obtain evidence.25 In addition to the Directive, the EU Member States can
also use Joint  Investigative Teams.26 The Directive is  indeed a significant
step  forward  since  it  indicates  a  gradual  shift  from  the  mutual  legal
assistance  mechanisms  (where  the  requested  Member  State  has  a  wide
discretion  to  comply  with  the  request  of  another  Member  State)  into  a
mutual recognition mechanism (where each Member State must in principle
recognise  and execute a request  coming from another Member State).27,28
However, in the context of transborder access, the Directive does still not
solve  the  need  for  time-critical  access  to  transborder  data  during  an
investigation  because  the  Directive  foresees  90  days  as  the  allowed
timeframe for responding to such requests.29
3.2 COUNCIL OF EUROPE
The  only  international  treaty  that  includes  provisions  regarding  mutual
MLA,  specifically  in  cyber  crime  cases,  is  the  Council  of  Europe  (CoE)
Convention on Cybercrime.  In addition  to inviting its  Parties  to provide
each other mutual assistance to the widest extent possible (Article 23 and
Article  25  p  1),  the  Convention  also  outlines  procedures  to  be  used  for
mutual  assistance  requests  in  the  absence  of  an  applicable  international
agreement (Article 27 and Article 28). With the aim to address the volatile
nature of electronic evidence, specific provisions also encourage 'expedited'
24 European Union, “The Stockholm Programme - An Open and Secure Europe Serving and
Protecting the Citizen 2010/C 115/01” (Council of the European Union, December 2, 2009), OJ C
115 4.5.2010.
25 Importantly, as of 22 May 2017, this Directive will replaces most of the existing laws in the
area  of  transferring  evidence  between  Member  States  in  criminal  cases.  Europan  Union,
Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  Regarding  the  European
Investigation Order in Criminal Matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, para. 1 (1).
26'Joint  Investigation  Teams  (JITs),' https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/joint-
investigation-teams-989.
27 European Union, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of Regarding the
European Investigation Order in Criminal Matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, para. 12.
28 Steve Peers and Emilio De Capitani, 'EU Law Analysis: The European Investigation Order: A
New Approach to Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters,' Blog, EU Law Analysis, (May 23,
2014), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2014/05/the-european-investigation-order-new.html.
29 Europan Union, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of Regarding the
European Investigation Order in Criminal Matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014, para. 12 (4).
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means of communication (Article 25 p 3), use of 24/7 networks (Article 35)
and sharing spontaneous information (Article 26). Notably, the Convention
includes options for expedited preservation of stored computer data where
the other Party is requested to preserve information stored in its territory
before the  mutual assistance request has been formally submitted (Article
29). Besides allowing for the provision on expedited disclosure of preserved
traffic data (Article 30), the Convention also provides for 'mutual assistance
regarding accessing of stored computer data' (Article 31). 
Article 31 is one of the principal legal constructs informing Parties about
options to access, under mutual assistance, data stored extraterritorially. It
allows for requesting the other Party to 'search or similarly access, seize or
similarly secure, and disclose data stored by means of a computer system
located within the territory of the requested Party, including data that has
been preserved pursuant  to  Article  29' (Article  31 p 1).  Importantly,  the
provision  also allows requests  for  such  assistance  on an expedited basis
where  'there  are  grounds  to  believe  that  relevant  data  is  particularly
vulnerable  to  loss  or  modification' or  there  are  other  legal  grounds  for
providing for expedited co-operation (Article 31, 3a). Unfortunately, there
are currently no statistics of the frequency of the use of mutual assistance to
access stored computer data amongst the Parties to the Convention; one of
the main reasons for this is the increasingly decentralised nature of mutual
legal assistance where a growing amount of requests are sent or received
directly  between  relevant  judicial  authorities  and  not  only  via  central
authorities.30
4. ASSESSMENT OF THE MLA SYSTEM
According  to  the  United  Nations,  approximately  70%  of  the  means  of
international  cooperation  in  cyber  crime  investigations  are  based  on
traditional MLA.31 Although a uniform approach to MLA treaties’ format,
content or other requirements is lacking, in some countries only the material
received  via  MLA,  as  opposed  to  data  being  obtained  via  alternative
channels,  can  be  used  as  evidence  in  court.32 In  others,  the  national
legislation offers more flexibility and requires accessing only certain types
30 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance
Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 6.
31 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, 201.
32 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance
Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 7.
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of data (such as content data) through a formal MLA request.33 There are
also countries that do not put forward a detailed regulatory framework and
only require the evidence to be gathered in accordance with the legislation
of the other State and not  to be in conflict with the principles of domestic
criminal procedure.34 In any case, the high percentage of the reported use of
MLA is  in  contrast  with  the  characteristics  of  the  MLA procedures  that
generally  do  not  satisfy  the  needs  of  modern  time-critical  cyber  crime
investigations.35
In the context of accessing extraterritorially stored computer data, MLA
procedures have been deemed to have a number of weaknesses. According
to  a  recent  CoE  study,  MLA  is  considered  “too  complex,  lengthy  and
resource intensive” and thus often abandoned.36 Indeed, MLA may take up
to months or even years for the requested evidence to reach the requesting
State.37 In addition to the inherent slowness of MLA procedures, they may
always not cover required investigative measures. There may be situations
where  there  is  no  MLA  treaty  in  place,  the  other  State  is  simply
uncooperative,  accessing  the  data  is  urgent  in  order  to  avoid  it  being
destroyed or where it is impossible to identify the jurisdiction of the data
altogether  (e.g.  due  to  the  characteristics  of  cloud  computing).38 Further
problems  include  refusals  to  cooperate  for  “small”  offences,  lack  of
information from the requested country about the receipt or the status of
the request, problems with the content of the requests (too broad, unclear
criteria  for  urgent  requests,  problems  with  language,  terminology)  and
differences in legal systems.39 Taking into account all of the above, it is no
surprise that the CoE has concluded, based on responses from 39 States, that
the MLA process is  considered inefficient  in  general and with respect to
obtaining  electronic  evidence  in  particular.40 Individual  States  have  also
33 Ibid.
34 Estonia, Code of Criminal Procedure, para. 65 (1).
35 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance
Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 38–39.
36 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance
Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 123.
37 Ibid., 39.
38 New Zealand and Law Commission, Search and Surveillance Powers (Wellington, N.Z.: Law
Commission, 2007), 226.
39 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance
Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 38–39.
40 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance
Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 123.
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acknowledged  that  current  mutual  assistance  arrangements  may  not  be
'sufficiently  tailored  to  facilitate  intangible  evidential  material  being
efficiently collected from other jurisdictions.'41
At the same time, according to the CoE, the Parties to the Convention
appear  not  to  be  making  full  use  of  the  opportunities  offered  by  the
Convention and other specific agreements.42 A set of recommendations for
both Parties  and other  relevant  entities  on how to improve MLA in  the
context of accessing stored computer data has therefore been proposed by
the CoE. Keeping in mind that MLA does foresee procedures that are in the
interests of the sovereign States since they allow for certain transparency
and overview of the activities of law enforcement targeting data stored on
foreign territory, States should show more initiative in updating bilateral
MLA treaties or reaching a consensus on more effective multilateral terms.
In  addition  to  MLA,  alternative  cooperation  mechanisms  must  be
considered.
5. ALTERNATIVE COOPERATION MECHANISMS
It must be reiterated that States are in need of more effective investigatory
mechanisms  for  fighting  against  cyber  crime,  and  several  formal  and
informal alternatives for transborder data access have already emerged or
are  currently  under  discussion.  These  approaches  for  accessing  and
obtaining data as part of an investigation from a foreign jurisdiction can be
roughly divided into two groups. 
5.1  ALTERNATIVE  COOPERATION  MECHANISMS  INVOLVING
THE STATE WHERE THE DATA RESIDES
The first group consists of formal and informal mechanisms that guide the
cooperation between the law enforcement of two or more countries  and,
thus,  involve  formal  or  informal  State  authorisation  in  allowing  for  the
requesting entity to access the data
In  addition  to  the  already  mentioned  MLA,  informal  cooperation
between law enforcement of different countries is a frequent measure for
sharing data related to cybercrime. Generally, law enforcement cooperation
is aimed at exchanging information that could lead to the commencement of
41 New Zealand and Law Commission, Search and Surveillance Powers, 227.
42 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance
Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 123.
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criminal  proceedings  even  if,  in  many  cases,  the  information  obtained
through such alternative cooperation cannot be used as evidence in criminal
proceedings.43
States  have  diverse  rules  as  to  what  data  may  be  shared  with  other
counterparts without the MLA framework.44 For example, some countries
may share specified traffic and subscriber data for investigative purposes,
others may share subscriber information based on reciprocity, while there
are  also  States  that  are  able  to  share  only  data  that  can  be  obtained
domestically by the police without compulsory measures and thus without
court  order.45 It  has  been thus proposed that  the  opening  of a  domestic
investigation  following  a  foreign  request  or  spontaneous  information
should facilitate the sharing of information without MLA, or even accelerate
MLA.46
As also proposed by the CoE Convention, 24/7 networks are maintained
and used,47 and spontaneously  disclosing  information  to the foreign law
enforcement “where it appears relevant to conduct seemingly connected to
the foreign territory, rather than waiting for the foreign LEA to commence
an investigation and initiate a formal MLA request” is encouraged.48 Also,
for  complex  international  cases,  the  frameworks  of  Europol,  Eurojust  or
Interpol  are  employed,  as  well  as  joint  investigation  teams,  or  law
enforcement liaison officers or networks.49
5.2 ALTERNATIVE COOPERATION MECHANISMS NOT 
INVOLVING THE STATE WHERE THE DATA RESIDES
The  second  group  of  mechanisms  for  accessing  and  obtaining
extraterritorial data by law enforcement is characterised by a certain extent
of “sidestepping” the State as the determining factor for the location of the
43 It must be noted that the distinction between police-to-police cooperation and MLA is not
always very clear. Read more Ibid., 7–8.
44 Ibid., 8.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Except for the use of MLAs, however, these methods are under-utilised and handle only
approximately 3 percent of the cyber crime cased confronted by LEAs. United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, xxv. About the role of 24/7 contact
points pertaining to mutual legal assistance for accessing stored computer data, see Council of
Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance Provisions of
the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 88–89.
48Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), The Mutual Legal Assistance
Provisions of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 9–10.
49 Ibid., 91.
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data, and thus not always asking for nor requiring the authorisation of any
of the formal State entities. 
Examples  of  such  a  way  forward  include  directly  contacting  the  SP,
accessing  data  publicly  available,  accessing  data  with  the  consent  of  the
'lawfully authorized entity'  and directly accessing the data either knowing
on unknowing its physical location. Whereas there is emerging evidence of
State  practice  as  well  as  developments  in  international  organisations
supporting  such  mechanisms,  the  approaches  to  regulating  law
enforcement’s  mandate  for  accessing  and acquiring  the  data  are  largely
divided and not sufficiently outlined in national legislation. Also, it is clear
that the use of such measures decreases the control of the sovereign State
over  the  foreign  law  enforcements’  requests  as  well  as  activities  for
accessing evidence stored in its own territory. 
It  is  not  uncommon that  law enforcement  would directly  request  the
foreign SP to disclose the necessary data.50 Such cooperation can be based
on the terms and conditions provided to the users that often clearly state
that  data  may  be  shared  with  law  enforcement  under  specific
circumstances.51 SPs may require due legal process for data disclosure, or
they may under some circumstances  comply voluntarily  with  direct  law
enforcement requests.52 Some SPs such as Ebay and Facebook even have
dedicated portals for facilitating such exchanges.53 At the same time, there
are on-going legal debates whether the SP is in the position to provide the
foreign law enforcement the requested data or whether this would require a
separate MLA request.54
50 Ian Walden, Accessing Data in the Cloud: The Long Arm of the Law Enforcement Agent,
SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, November 14, 2011),
55,  http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1781067;  Micheál  O’Floinn,  'It  Wasn’t  All  White  Light
before Prism: Law Enforcement Practices in Gathering Data Abroad, and Proposals for Further
Transnational Access at the Council of Europe,' Computer Law & Security Review 29, no. 5
(October 2013):  611.  United Nations Office on Drugs  and Crime,  Comprehensive Study on
Cybercrime, xxii–xxiii.
51 Simon Bradshaw, Christopher Millard, and Ian Walden, 'Contracts for Clouds: Comparison
and Analysis of the Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services,' International Journal
of Law and Information Technology 19, no. 3 (September 21, 2011): 187–223.
52 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, xxii–xxiii.
53 E.g.  eBay  Inc.,  “Law  Enforcement  eRequest  System,”  accessed  June  1,  2014,
https://lers.corp.ebay.com/AIP/portal/home.do;  Facebook,  “Law  Enforcement  Online
Requests,”  accessed  June  1,  2014,  https://www.facebook.com/records/x/login/  quoted  in
O’Floinn, “It Wasn’t All White Light before Prism,” 611.
54 United States District Court, In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account:
Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation (2014); 2012/CO/1054 Yahoo! Inc (Court
of Appeal of Antwerp, 12th chamber for criminal cases 2013).
2015] A. Osula: Mutual Legal Assistance & Other Mechanisms ... 55
The  CoE’s  Convention  of  Cybercrime  Article  32  is  another  basis  for
accessing  extraterritorially  located  data  with  consent  (Article  32  (b))  or
where publicly available (Article 32 (a)). For the purposes of accessing data
not  publiclz  available  and  stored  extraterritorially,  Article  32  (b)  is
especially  relevant.  It  allows  parties  to  'access  or  receive  through  a
computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in another
Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the person
who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the Party through that
computer  system.'55 This  clause  in  particular  has  whirled  up  a  lot  of
controversy, leading to some countries indicating this as a reason not to join
the Convention.56 Problematically, Article 32 (b) could be interpreted as to
allow for remote search and seizure,57 albeit with a lot of confusion as to the
exact conditions for such an investigative measure. Fuelling the sensitivity
of this clause, the explanatory memorandum does not fully clarify the exact
meaning of the terms and concepts put forward in the clause. Given that the
current  wording  is  not  clear  about  the  exact  meaning  of  the  'lawful
authority',  some  commentators  suggest  that  the  provision  in  its  current
wording probably contradicts fundamental principles of international law
since law enforcement is not allowed to carry out investigations in another
State without the consent of the competent authorities in that State.58 It has
been noted that the decision whether such investigative measures should be
allowed should not be dependent on the authorisation of an individual but
should remain with the States, also for purposes for overall transparency.59
Neither have the wording or the procedures for the investigation been fully
clarified  by  the  CoE  Guidance  Note  on  the  interpretation  and
implementation of Article 32.60 The guidance note does, however, confirm
that Article 32 (b) is an exception to the principle of territoriality in the sense
55 Council  of  Europe,  Convention  on  Cybercrime,  vol.  ETS  No.  185,  2001,  para.  32(b),
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm.
56 Keir Giles, 'Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues,' in 2012 4th International Conference
on Cyber Conflict, ed. C. Czosseck, R. Ottis, and K. Ziolkowski (NATO CCD COE Publication,
2012),  66–67,
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/2012proceedings/2_1_Giles_RussiasPublicStanceOnCyberI
nformationWarfare.pdf.
57 Ian  Walden,  Computer  Crimes  and  Digital  Investigations  (Oxford;  New  York:  Oxford
University Press, 2007), 319.
58 Gercke, Understanding Cybercrime: Phenomena, Challenge and Legal Response, 277.
59 Ibid.,  278.  See  also  Nicolai  Seitz,  \Transborder  Search:  A  New  Perspective  in  Law
Enforcement,' Yale JL & Tech. 7 (2004): 40.
60 Cybercrime Convention Committee, '(T-CY) Guidance Note #3 Transborder Access to Data
(Article 32)', 3 December 2014.
56 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 9:1
that it permits  'unilateral transborder access without the need for mutual
assistance under limited circumstances.'61
In an attempt to address MLA inefficiencies, and building on examples
of  national  legislations  allowing  for  transborder  access  (also  known  as
'direct access') under certain conditions, the CoE also proposed in 2013 the
adoption  of  Additional  Protocol  to  the  Convention  on  Cybercrime
regarding transborder access to data.62 However, due to lack of consensus
on the way forward, the CoE concluded in 2014 that the  'negotiation of a
Protocol on transborder access to data would not be feasible'.63
6. DISCUSSION
As  an  increasing  number  of  crimes  involve  geo-distributed  electronic
evidence, transborder access to data is relevant not only for cyber crime but
for  all  crimes  in  general.  Previous  sections  have  introduced  different
cooperation  mechanisms  used  for  transborder  access  to  evidence.
Mechanisms  such  as  MLA  and  the  informal  cooperation  between  law
enforcement entities generally rely on the authorisation of the other State
before  gaining  access  to  the  data.  Such  mechanisms  are  therefore  being
guided  by  the  territoriality  principle  that  focuses,  as  the  principal
counterpart of the investigation, on the country in whose territory the data
being sought resides. Thereby, the sovereignty of the other State is not being
breached and the  State  remains  in  control  of  the  investigative  measures
being carried out on its  territory or pertaining to the data located on its
territory. 
Despite the frequent use of MLA, the article has indicated a number of
factors that do not render the MLA framework as entirely suitable for the
time-critical  access  to  extraterritorially  located data.  Notwithstanding the
fact  that  the  efficiency  of  MLA procedures  in  accessing  extraterritorially
located data has been criticised for years, little concrete improvement can be
observed. Examples of two organisations actively seeking to provide better
61 Ibid.
62 Council  of  Europe  Cybercrime  Convention  Committee  (T-CY),  (Draft)  Elements  of  an
Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime Regarding Transborder Access
to  Data,  April  9,  2013,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/Cybercrime/TCY/TCY
%202013/T-CY%282013%2914transb_elements_protocol_V2.pdf.
63 Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), Transborder Access to Data
and  Jurisdiction:  Options  for  Further  Action  by  the  T-CY,  December  3,  2014,  12–13,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/Cybercrime/TCY/2014/T-
CY(2014)16_TBGroupReport_v17adopted.pdf.
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condition  for  transborder  access  are  the  EU  and  the  CoE.  While  the
developments  in  both  organisations  such  as  the  EU’s  Directive  on  the
European Investigation Order and the option for Joint Investigative Teams
as well as the CoE’s work on analysing options for transborder access and
carrying out an extensive study on MLA procedures must be commended,
their efforts do not address the full spectrum of challenges to transborder
access.
The alternative  measures  introduced in  this  article  include  contacting
directly the SP (such as exemplified by  the quoted  Microsoft and Yahoo!
cases) or practicing 'direct' transborder access (such as allowed by the CoE
Convention Article  32  or  under  certain  circumstances,  by  some national
legal  frameworks).  In  fact,  it  has  been  reported  that  law  enforcement
authorities  may,  in  practice,  either  with  or  without  the  knowledge  of
investigators,  directly  access  extraterritorial  data  without  the  consent  of
either  a  'person with  lawful  authority' (as  stated in  the CoE Convention
Article  32 (b)) or the SP, and in many cases not knowing in which exact
jurisdiction that data might reside.64 An example of such a case is  where
investigators can make use of an existing live connection from a suspect’s
device  such  as  a  computer  or  mobile  phone  or  where  investigators  use
lawfully obtained data access credentials to access cloud data.65 This reality,
even  if  not  officially  acknowledged  or  supported  by  the  majority  of
governments,  is  reinforcing  the  argument  that  technological  change,  the
increase  in  sophisticated  threats  and  the  need  to  redress  harmful  local
effects  of  malicious  offshore  activities  can  be  seen  as  altering  the
extraterritorial influence of purely territorial action.66
However, even if in some cases used in practice, these mechanisms do
not assume the central role of the State where the data is located. Instead of
focusing  on  territoriality,  these  measures  prioritise  quick  access  to  the
evidence.  In  addition  to  raising  the  obvious  question  of  violating  the
sovereignty of the other State, such access may also raise data protection
and privacy concerns of the individuals whose data has been accessed. 
64 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, 222.
65 Ibid.
66 Jack Goldsmith, 'The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border Searches,' in The
University  of  Chicago  Legal  Forum,  Forthcoming,  2001,  7,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=285732.
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Thus, since the need for more operational tools in the fight against cyber
crime will not decrease, countries will have to actively look for solutions.67
Generally speaking, countries are facing two main courses of action that do
not necessarily contradict each other. 
Firstly, countries may take steps towards finding consensus on the use of
alternative measures for accessing transborder data, such as reflected in the
work  undertaken  by  the  CoE.  This  would,  however,  require  wider
discussions  and  possibly  reaching  common  ground  on  a  number  of
interrelated issues that broadly touch upon the '(re)-conceptualization of the
extent to  which ‘data location’  can still  be used as a guiding principle',68
especially in circumstances where the exact location of the data cannot be
identified.  To  do that,  the  debates  on the  interpretation  of  the  limits  of
territorial  sovereignty that  would allow for,  under certain circumstances,
direct access to the data or the SP without the prior authorisation of the
other State must be revisited. Also, the extraterritorial scope of jurisdiction
must  be  addressed,  especially  as  regards  to  examples  recently  adopted
national legislation such as Brazil announcing its laws apply to companies
that  collect,  store,  retain  or  process  personal  or  communications  data
whenever at least one of these activities occurs in Brazilian territory, also
applying  to  every  piece  of  data  collected  domestically  as  well  as
communication content whenever at least one of the terminals involved in
the traffic  is  located in Brazil,  and also in situations where the service is
offered to the Brazilian public or when the provider has a branch in that
country.69
Foremost, transparency is needed concerning States’ official positions in
such legal assessments together with examples of accepted State practice.
Without  sharing  these  with  the  international  community,  concrete
agreements for further options for transborder access will be doubtful. 
Secondly, and assuming that this would be the preferred choice of States
keen to protect its  sovereignty, States may support the reform of current
MLA procedures.70 This appears not to be an easy process since, despite the
clear  need  for  more  effective  investigative  tools,  States  have  largely
67 For a comprehensive set of possible solutions, see Gail Kent, 'Sharing Investigation Specific
Data  with  Law  Enforcement  -  An  International  Approach,' Stanford  Public  Law  Working
Paper, February 14, 2014, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2472413.
68 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime, 223.
69 Brazil,  Presidency  of  the  Republic,  Law  No.  12.965,  April  23rd  2014,  Article  11;  Francis
Augusto Medeiros and Lee A Bygrave, ‘Brazil’s Marco Civil Da Internet: Does It Live up to the
Hype?’ (2015) 31 Computer Law & Security Review, 127.
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refrained  from  open  discussions  on  how  to  enhance  these  traditional
frameworks.  It  is  unclear  what  the motivation of the States would be to
avoid  agreeing  on  more  clear  rules  for  more  effective  international
cooperation.  Perhaps  one  of  the  reasons  could  be  the  general  lack  of
statistics  related  to  cyber  crime  (lack  of  reporting,  lack  of  initiating
prosecution, lack of statistics on the use of different cooperation measures)
and, hence, the insufficient underlining of the urgency of dealing with these
issues. Assuming, however, that the gap in awareness will be bridged, an
initiative could be taken, or efforts continue to be pursued, by international
organisations such as the EU or the CoE or a group of likeminded States. Of
course,  such  geographically  restricted  agreements  would  have  their
limitations  regarding  global  cooperation  but  would  nevertheless  set  an
example  of  effective  and  transparent  measures  to  other  States  and
encourage them to follow the lead.
7. CONCLUSION
This  article  has  discussed  the  role  of  MLA  and  other  established
mechanisms of international cooperation in the context of facilitating access
to extraterritorially located data. International cooperation mechanisms for
accessing  extraterritorially  located  data  were  divided  into  two  groups.
Firstly, there is a group of mechanisms such as MLA, which is being used
most  frequently,  and  informal  cooperation  between  law  enforcement
entities  that  generally rely on the authorisation  of the other  State before
gaining access to the data. Secondly, there are alternative mechanisms such
as contacting the SP or directly accessing the data that do not assume the
central role of the State where the data is located but rather prioritise quick
access  to  the  evidence.  As  highlighted  above,  both  of  these  groups  of
mechanisms have their own pros and cons.
However,  MLA,  as  the  most  frequently  used  means  for  accessing
extraterritorially located data, has proven to be largely unsuitable for the
volatile nature of electronic evidence. The article concludes that unless the
identified  inefficiencies  pertaining  to MLA are  addressed,  the  traditional
focus  on  territoriality  and  assuming  the  other  State  being  the  primary
counterpart for carrying out investigative measures requiring transborder
70 A comprehensive list of proposals has been put forvard by Council of Europe Cybercrime
Convention  Committee  (T-CY),  The  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Provisions  of  the  Budapest
Convention on Cybercrime.
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access  to  evidence  will  continue  to  gradually  shift  to  more  operational
mechanisms that do not necessarily require the prior authorisation of the
State where the data is located. However, distancing from formal MLA will
bring  along  challenges  regarding  the  transparency  of  criminal
investigations  and  decrease  the  control  of  the  sovereign  State  over
investigations  and  their  conditions  regarding  the  data  residing  in  their
territory.
For  finding  a  common  ground  between  States,  and  overcoming  the
inconclusive  state of  international  law,  viable  options and conditions  for
transborder access should be addressed in open discussions where States
share  their  legal  assessments  together  with  examples  of  accepted  State
practice.  These  discussions  could  be  facilitated,  and  continue  to  be
supported, by international organisations such as the EU or the CoE.
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